Introduction
Interlocking directorates refer to a corporate governance structure whereby directors serve on the boards of multiple firms. Probably the most common type of interlock analysed in the literature is that between financial institutions and non-financial firms.
Whilst the practice of establishing bank-firm interlocks is not as popular in the Netherlands today as in neighbouring Germany, 1 interlocks of this kind were all the rage in this country in the early twentieth century. 2 Using a case study from this small open economy, which until the Second World War had a largely unregulated financial services sector, 3 this article shows how understanding the "direction of influence" of an interlocking directorate is important in explaining how this governance structure can cause damaging conflicts of interest within universal banks, German-style financial institutions which offer both commercial and investment banking services. 4 Economic sociologists, financial economists and economic historians have each sought to explain the phenomenon of interlocking directorates. Broad categories of reasons advanced include: 5 (1) Marxist theories of financial exploitation by social elites;
(2) bank-control and family-control explanations, which use agency theory to analyse banker or family networks as decision-making centres of high-finance; (3) the resourcedependency view, where interlocks are used by firms as a means of lowering information and transaction costs and gaining privileged access to markets; (4) the managerial view, where interlocks are merely expressions of prestige; and (5) the classcohesion view, where directors are all recruited from a common social group and contribute to this group's social cohesion.
Economic sociologists in particular have shown that these five explanations are not necessarily mutually exclusive; some mixture can operate side-by-side. 6 Financial economists have been predominantly occupied with the task of measuring the costs and benefits of interlocks. 7 They show that trade-offs exist between improved monitoring on the one hand, and various conflicts of interest on the other. Contributions to this journal have been good at quantifying interlocks between banks and non-financials in history. 8 Taken together, they demonstrate that their costs and benefits vary wildly across time and by place. Elsewhere, economic historians have shown that bank-firm interlocks can in some markets significantly improve firm performance, whilst their presence in others is merely a sign of bankers' desperation. 9 Aside from sociological researches that use interviews to ascertain the influence of specific interlocks, 10 studies of interlocking directorates have largely provided macro-perspectives on this corporate governance structure, looking to quantify their effects at an aggregated level. Consequently, these works offer limited insight into the micro-level process through which interlocks can affect performance, including the impact of an interlock's direction of influence -whether firms end up managing or being managed by their ties. To understand an interlock's direction of influence, the first step in a micro-study must be to ascertain whether a firm sends or receives executives from its interlocked firms. But a catalogue of this alone is insufficient to conclusively determine direction; factors including executive remuneration, social ties, prestige, and even personality type may result in executives doing the bidding of their interlocked firms rather than that of their primary employer.
This article contributes by providing the micro-level detail necessary to understand the full implications of interlocking directorates in a case study from Dutch history. It analyses the interlock between the Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging, a large universal bank, and Wm. H. Müller & Co., a trading conglomerate. Referred to simply by its acronym "Robaver" in the contemporary press, this bank is one of the main predecessors of ABN AMRO, which until it was split up and sold off in 2007 was among the world's largest. 11 Meanwhile, Müller & Co. partly survives today in the form of Imtech, a technical services provider to the shipping and construction industries. 12 Executives of these two concerns, which both came close to failure in the Dutch financial crisis of the 1920s, sat on each other's supervisory boards. The direction of influence was not obviously from the bank to the firm; the fact that this was a mutual tie alone suggests that the nature of this interlock can only be gleaned from a detailed case history.
The aim of this article is to investigate the impact of the Robaver-Müller tie on the performance of Robaver during the 1920s, to discern whether, and to what degree, the interlock was responsible for the bank's near collapse in 1924. By examining this interlock at a time of crisis, this article is able to explore the workings of a corporate governance structure that remain largely hidden in more stable times, when issues surrounding bank leadership tend to be largely uncontroversial in the eyes of the investing public. The method used is to construct, and then analyse, a detailed narrative of the Robaver crisis that combines contemporary press commentary with the internal records of the bank. By comparing the events of the Robaver-Müller case with those surrounding another of the bank's problematic managerial ties, and by contrasting the performance of Robaver with that of a competing bank that chose a different business policy and corporate governance structure, this article advances an "interpretive model"
to explain how the direction of influence of an interlocking directorate can determine the nature and severity of conflicts of interest. 13 Together, the narrative and model suggest that Robaver's newly adopted universal banking business model left it with a flat, or decentralised, organisational structure, and a lemon as a major customer whose director was able to use this structure to his own advantage. Moreover, it uses information economics, which studies how information and its revelation affect economic decisions, to interpret this narrative, to build a stylised model of the Dutch case.
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The Dutch financial services sector in the early twentieth century
Financial sectors around the world are often categorised as being either bank-based or market-based. 18 There is a long tradition, epitomised by the work of Gerschenkron, which classifies Germany as being bank-based and the UK as market-based. 19 The idea is that bank-based financial sectors are populated with powerful universal banks which offer the full range of financial services, whilst market-based ones contain less influential functionally-separated commercial and investment banks. Whilst in the former, banks actively hold equity stakes in non-financial firms, in the latter, nonfinancials use banks only to help place their equity on open markets, where it is bought by a diverse constituency of investors. Whilst this view has been somewhat revised by economic historians, 20 it nevertheless remains a useful characterisation, with countries lying somewhere between these two theoretical extremes.
The Netherlands is an interesting case in point. At the turn of the twentieth century, the country's banks played second fiddle to its capital markets. But from about 1911, and especially during the Great War, the economy started to look more like the bank-based German one. Banks replaced the prolongatie on-call money market that had dominated Dutch finance in the nineteenth century. 21 A wave of bank mergers commenced just prior to the Great War to create sophisticated multi-branch networks with a wide portfolio of clients. 22 The war itself and the post-war economic boom that followed sped up banks' move towards being universal in scope, with banks directly financing businesses with both debt and equity. The regulatory regime at the time was relatively laissez-faire: Dutch law did not prohibit commercial banks from providing investment services. By tradition, Dutch firms employed a dual board structure on the German model, with a management board made up of directeuren (executive directors), and supervisory board of commissarissen (non-executive directors). 26 Jonker uses the number of interlocks between banks and industry as an indicator of banking scope, with an increase in interlocks suggesting a move towards universal service provision, as banks install directors in the firms they finance. 27 Rotterdam. This led to a flat organisational structure where, in many respects, offices operated de facto independently of one another. Robaver then bought up provincial banks and merged these into a single subsidiary, the Utrecht-based Nationale
Bankvereeniging (Natobank), described by Westerman's son as part of a conscious expansionary strategy to emulate Germany's universal banks. 30 The bank was among the first to mechanise its back-office, 31 and, by the early 1920s, was the country's second-largest bank by market capitalisation. 32 It was also the largest casualty of the 1920s financial crisis, which, as the research in this paper uncovers, wiped out over a third of its capital and led to a serious bank run. 33 The existing literature on the macro-causes of the 1920s financial crisis is dominated by the work of Jonker, 34 the definitive restatement of which is found in Van Zanden's contribution to an edited volume on Dutch financial history. 35 It holds that the crisis was a result of banks' over-exuberance during the Great War and immediate postwar period. Large and sustained declines in aggregate demand and prices in the early 1920s -declines which were largely due to international factors, but arguably aggravated by (expectations of) the Dutch guilder's return to pre-war gold parity -put pressure on business and thus the banking sector which it had increasingly come to rely on. In short, Dutch banks became over-exposed to the sectors of the economy that suffered most at the hands of debt-deflation. 36 The next section illustrates how this macro-cause was felt at a micro-level in the case of Robaver.
A narrative of the Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging in crisis
This is a single case study, and so no a priori and testable theoretical model of the causes of banking crises is developed. Instead this section serves to lay bare the facts of this particular crisis in a case narrative. The next section develops an interpretive model that uses information economics to understand these facts. The narrative starts in late 1922, as the signs of the problems surrounding the Robaver-Müller interlock start to become apparent to the outside world. 37 It ends in late 1925, as the post-crisis clean-up operation is in full swing. In particular, the narrative highlights three aspects of the Robaver crisis: (1) the internal management difficulties experienced by the bank; (2) the impact of information asymmetries between privileged insiders and the investing public on the bank's fate; and (3) how interlocking directorates influenced both these aspects. Despite the bank's internal worries, the publication of Robaver's annual report to shareholders in May 1924 reads on the whole upbeat, blaming the bank's 'minor problems' on the business cycle. 51 The report apparently passed through the bank's layers of management with little opposition: its commissarissen approved a draft with just minor corrections at their meeting on 23 April, 52 thus agreeing to a 4.5 millionguilder dividend for ordinary shareholders. Meanwhile, De Kroniek is not overly convinced with the bank's upbeat tone, suggesting that it still has to kick the habit of inflating its figures. 53 The article estimates that of the bank's reported 36. There is a strange absence of records of directors meetings in the immediate build-up to the publication of the above communiqué. From De Vries's account of the Robaver crisis, which makes use of the personal correspondence of some of the bank's directors deposited in DNB's archives, it appears that these meetings were held in private at the homes of directors and remained unminuted. 65 Whilst the public appears to remain in the dark about the goings on in the finance ministry, 67 Westerman explains in detail the chain of events that led to DNB's intervention, and the published communiqué, at the next meeting of the commissarissen on 10 July: 69 However, a fully-blown run on the bank, depleting all its resources, was apparently avoided: 'At the current moment withdrawals appear to have come to an end'. 70 The government provided 10 million guilders with which to stabilise the share price because DNB refused to do so itself. But Colijn did not initially want to be seen openly to have lent support to Robaver and therefore used an intermediary, the firm Van
Loon & Co. 71 Later in the same meeting, the minutes record that DNB wishes Robaver to appoint a 'competent Dutchman of standing' as a new director who would then help reassure the public.
Post-mortems and purges
On 15 July, De Kroniek publishes a detailed report on the Robaver crisis addressing four issues: 72 (1) what occurred in the two weeks following the communiqué; (2) This is supported by the minutes of the comité meeting held immediately prior to the 17 September commissarissen meeting, at which a dialogue between Robaver and DNB is recounted. 76 Despite Van der Mandele's pleas, Furness-Stokvis, the firm he helps to supervise, is not incorporated into this restructuring plan.
The finalised details of this restructuring plan, minus the identities of its financial backers, are published only a month later in De Kroniek. 77 The press release also informs shareholders that the position of president is to be abolished, that
Westerman is to be redeployed as a commissaris and that Van Hengel, a director at Ambank, is to be made gedelegeerd commissaris (de facto caretaker president). De Kroniek addresses three issues concerning Robaver's news: (1) the continued lack of clarity concerning the crisis; (2) the possibility of harmful collusion in the banking sector; and (3) the position of Westerman. These are addressed as follows. (1) The article argues that the public is none the wiser as to why the crisis occurred in the first place. The press release does not reveal the origin of the 25 million to be used to reduce the bank's capitalisation, only that it is from 'friendly hands'. ( 
Long-term solutions
Van Hengel stayed on at Robaver until 1927, after which he returned to Ambank.
During his reign, three wide-sweeping reforms were implemented at the bank: (1) he paved the way for the incorporation of the Natobank subsidiary into Robaver; (2) he oversaw a comprehensive change of personnel on the bank's supervisory board; and (3) he led the restructuring of bad debt. Van Hengel's changes were conducted not without opposition from Robaver's existing team of directors, 80 or its major clients.
Especially Van Hengel's efforts to restructure the debt of the Müller & Co.
conglomerate were important for the bank's long-run stability. His close involvement is evident from his collected personal correspondence with Kröller. 81 
An interpretive model of the crisis
The narrative of the previous section shows that Robaver's strategy of expanding into the business of universal banking had left it with a flat organisational structure that was ill-designed for managers to effectively steer it through a period of debt-deflation.
Whilst a universal business model does not as a rule lead to decentralised management, nor necessarily an increased use of interlocking directorates, it did in the Dutch case. was not a sufficient one. Robaver's problems were first and foremost due to its earlieradopted universal banking policy, the interlock and decentralised management structure being consequences of this policy. There is an extensive literature on the costs and benefits of the universal banking, a type of business model also known as "relationship banking". The existence of a trade-off between banking scope -the choice between universal and functionally-separated banking -and financial stability is contentious. 88 Universal banks are often touted as being able to reduce the problems of asymmetric information suffered by functionally-separated banks. 89 However, their simultaneous presence in both the commercial and investment banking markets potentially creates damaging conflicts of interest. Universal banks are recognised to benefit from highly diversified portfolios. However, they may be less versatile during an economic downturn as they are geared towards the long-term and may struggle to meet depositor
demand.
An interpretive model describes how Robaver's universal banking policy, and resulting managerial structure, could have been responsible for its problems. Boot and
Thakor provide an appropriate starting point. 90 They posit that firms face a trade-off between: (1) bank financing, where banks have the ability to better determine moral hazard, the tendency to take undue risk if this risk-taking can be hidden; and (2) capital market financing, where firms have the ability to adapt to performance information through prices. There exists some quality cut-off point, below which borrowers approach commercial banks -a firm's moral hazard is too severe and requires bank monitoring -and above which they approach investment banks for access to capital markets. Whilst functionally-separated investment banks can choose their portfolios solely based on the costs and benefits of capital market variables, universal banks, which provide both services "under one roof", are able to internalise any potential downside risks through their commercial banking arms. Conflicts of interest arise here because the principal in one half of the business acts as an agent in the other half. There may be a tendency for banks to positively select risky customers, due to the moral hazard of being able to cover any losses out of their depositors' purse. Recognising this conflict, an adverse selection problem may arise; commercial clients with less risky businesses choose to exit the market à la Akerlof's "market for lemons", 91 leaving only high-risk crisis-prone clients behind.
Adding the practice of interlocking directorates to the Boot and Thakor framework, sharing managers with a bank in return for access to financing may reduce moral hazard problems, but it also makes it more costly for firms to end a banking relationship in the future, as the bank's directors exert influence over the firm's financing decisions. Clients with less risky businesses may therefore never seek out such ties in the first place, choosing alternative sources of finance that do not come with managerial ties. The net result is that banks that choose to adopt interlocks may be left with a portfolio of lemons; the problem suffered by universal banks is amplified when combined with interlocking directorates. Comparing Robaver with Ambank illustrates this point. Whilst the former enthusiastically adopted universal banking with interlocks, the latter was more reluctant. Whilst the former required a government bailout in 1924, the latter not only survived the crisis unscathed, but also provided the former with the managerial expertise necessary to resolve its troubles.
Finally, adding direction of influence to this interpretive model helps explain why the Robaver-Müller tie was more damaging that the Robaver-Furness-Stokvis one.
After a period in which "good" firms actively choose not to employ the services of a universal bank which adopts interlocks, and combined with that bank's leadership managing to extract itself financially from those crisis-stricken firms over which it has some managerial influence, the bank is ultimately left only with the worst kind of clients: ones with which it has an interlock with a direction of influence running from the firm to the bank, where the bank does the firm's bidding, whatever the cost. In summary, the use of interlocking directorates as a corporate governance structure ultimately led to financial instability in the Dutch case.
Explanations of financial crises arising from information economics focus on the differences in information available to different parties in a financial contract. 92 Adverse selection problems arise because lenders cannot distinguish between borrowers and end up setting a price that attracts only the risky. Moral hazard problems arise because borrowers have an incentive to engage in risky activities as lenders cannot easily ascertain their effort. Banks exist to reduce these problems, but are not always able to do so, such as in situations in which they have little ability to punish risky customers. In the case of Furness-Stokvis, the direction of influence was such that Robaver was easily able to punish its client by ending its financial relationship with the ailing concern. The direction of the Robaver-Müller tie meant that the bank's customer was also its manager; punishing the conglomerate for bad behaviour proved difficult.
In a deflationary cycle like that experienced in the Netherlands in the 1920s, wealth is redistributed from debtor to creditor, increasing the real value of debt and reducing borrowers' net worth. Bankers, very aware of this problem, must reduce their exposure to risky customers and absolutely cannot be seen to increase it further out of fear that they will be identified as a weak player. As the Robaver case shows, if the direction of influence of an interlock prevents them from achieving this, then they may have to resort to hiding their problems from the world. But as information leaks out that a bank's interlock is preventing it from restructuring, or even just a rumour that this might be the case, the bank may have to resort to drastic measures to resolve its problems. A crisis may become self-fulfilling; 93 by acknowledging that it has sought outside help, a bank run may ensue as the panicked reaction of some depositors makes it rational for others to withdraw their deposits. The effect of the DNB communiqué must be seen in this light; the June 1924 run on Robaver's branch network may never have occurred had it not been published.
Conclusion
The current literature on interlocking directorates is very good at counting and quantifying their costs and benefits. The case study approach used here complements this with a micro-perspective on conflicts of interest arising from bank-firm interlocks. 
